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The Aftermath of Copenhagen: Does 
International Law have a Role to Play in a 
Global Response to Climate Change? 
 
JACOB WERKSMAN†& KIRK HERBERTSON‡ 
_______________________ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International negotiations on a global response to climate change 
have, since they were launched in the early 1990s, faced two linked 
challenges: (1) agreeing on a long-term strategy for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) that responds to the threat of 
climate change and that reflects the common but differentiated 
responsibilities of all major emitters of these gases; and (2) capturing 
these responsibilities in the form of a legally binding instrument. 
At the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Copenhagen,1 the international community moved a step closer to 
responding to the first challenge. For the first time in the climate 
change negotiations, all major emitters—including more than ninety 
developed and developing countries—have come forward with 
pledges that reflect what they are willing to do to reduce greenhouse 
 
 † Program Director of Institutions and Governance, World Resources Institute 
and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and New York 
University School of Law. This Article draws heavily from Jacob Werksman and 
Kirk Herbertson, The Legal Character of National Actions and Commitments in a 
Copenhagen Agreement: Options and Implications (World Resources Institute, 
Working Paper) (updated in light of the results from COP-15), available at 
http://www.wri.org. 
 ‡ Associate, World Resources Institute. 
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
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gas emissions. These pledges have since been included in the 
appendices of the ―Copenhagen Accord‖ as a two-page political 
declaration that was ―noted‖ but not adopted at the end the of the 
Conference.2 The Accord is not a legally binding agreement. Does it 
matter? 
Most governments, developed and developing, maintain that a 
legally binding instrument is essential to the next stage in the design 
of an international climate change regime.3 Hundreds of 
nongovernmental environment and development organizations have 
urged their governments to agree on and enter into a ―fair, ambitious 
and binding‖ outcome.4 Why then, does consensus on the legal 
 
2. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Fifteenth Sess., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen, Den., Draft 
Decision -/CP 15: Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
3. See, for example, the post-Copenhagen position of the European 
Commission, stating that ―[o]ur primary objective remains to reach a robust and 
legally-binding agreement under the UNFCCC.‖ Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: International Climate Policy 
post-Copenhagen: Acting now to Reinvigorate Global Action on Climate Change, 
at 4, COM (2010) 86 final (Mar. 9, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/com_2010_86.pdf. See also the post-
Copenhagen submission of the United States on next steps for the climate change 
negotiations, indicating that:  
[t]he United States considers that it would be valuable to address the 
intended legal character of the agreed outcome earlier rather than later. The 
United States supports a legally binding outcome in Mexico provided that 
the legally binding elements in an otherwise acceptable agreement would 
apply in a symmetrical manner to all major economies.  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
Eleventh Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., Apr. 9–11, 2010, and Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Ninth Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., 
Apr. 9–11, 2010, Views on the Need for Additional Meeting Time for the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under 
the Convention, and on Organization of Work of the Ad Hoc working Group on 
Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention: Submission From Parties—
United States of America, at 50, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/MISC.1, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.1 (Mar. 16, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Submission 
to Ad Hoc Working Group], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awg 
lca9/eng/misc01.pdf. 
4. JULIE-ANNE RICHARDS, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT’L, FAIR, AMBITIOUS 
& BINDING: ESSENTIALS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE DEAL 10 (2009), 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/climate-change-basics/CAN_FAB_Essentials.pdf 
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character of a climate agreement remain elusive? The analysis that 
follows reveals two interconnected reasons. 
Firstly, even as developing countries begin to embrace, on their 
own terms, their part of a common responsibility for responding to 
climate change, they insist that the legal character of that 
responsibility remain differentiated from the responsibilities of 
developed countries. This issue is of particular concern to the so-
called ―major economy‖ developing countries, whose per capita 
wealth remains relatively low, but whose national emissions have 
grown to include a significant share of global totals. Developed 
country counterparts have shown a willingness to accept a high 
degree of differentiation between the level of effort required of richer 
and poorer countries but insist that all major economies—developed 
and developing—be part of an agreement of the same legal character. 
From this perspective, international legal character seems to matter 
very much.  
Secondly, as more countries have come forward with pledges of 
targets and actions in the absence of a new, legally binding 
instrument, some governments have begun to signal that a ―soft law‖ 
approach to the climate negotiations may be sufficient. What really 
matters is that the pledges reflect measurable, reportable, and 
verifiable actions and that they are embedded in domestic law. From 
this perspective, the international legal character of a future climate 
agreement seems less important.  
Because UNFCCC parties have failed to adopt rules of procedure 
that would have allowed it to take decisions other than by consensus, 
parties have had a particularly challenging time closing the gap 
between countries on issues of the ambition and balance of 
commitments, as well as on the legal nature of a climate agreement. 
Indeed, in the absence of rules that would allow majority voting, even 
a substantial majority of parties must overcome the formal objections 
of a few before any decisions could be taken, including those that 
could lead to legally binding instruments. 
This Article briefly describes the shifting expectations of the role 
of international legal character in the development of a climate 
change agreement. It highlights the perspective of developing country 
major economies (in particular Brazil, South Africa, China, and 
 
(emphasis added). 
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India—the BASIC countries) which are under growing pressure to 
undertake legally binding commitments to reduce their emissions. It 
then provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the elements of 
legal character in other multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) and reviews the history of how previous climate change 
agreements reflect these elements. Finally, it seeks to analyze the 
costs and benefits of entering into a legally binding agreement and 
what this might mean for major economies as well as for the future 
development of the climate change regime. It concludes that there are 
at least two possible ways to manage the tension between ambitious, 
broadly applicable commitments and a legally binding instrument. 
The first option would be to pursue arrangements of a nonbinding 
nature, under which countries ―pledge and review‖ policies 
developed at the national level and rely on politics rather than law to 
underpin the regime at the international level. The second option is to 
continue to use the UNFCCC, a legally binding treaty, as the 
backbone for future commitments but to invest deeply in UNFCCC 
procedures and institutions to review and promote compliance with 
commitments of a ―soft law‖ nature. 
II. SHIFTING EXPECTATIONS OF THE ROLE OF LAW IN A GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 
Since 1990, when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) first 
recognized the need for an international response to the threat of 
climate change, it has been assumed that a legally binding treaty 
would be key to that response.5 UNGA set in train a process that led 
to the 1992 UNFCCC, a legally binding treaty containing minimal 
commitments reflecting the ―common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities‖6 in the context of climate change by 
dividing the world into Annex I (developed) and non-Annex 
(developing) countries. In many ways the UNFCCC set an 
expectation that the climate regime will move forward in a legally 
binding form as long as the commitments it contains are highly 
differentiated between developed and developing countries. 
Following a review of the scientific adequacy of the UNFCCC’s 
 
5. See Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of 
Mankind, G.A. Res. 45/212, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/212 (Dec. 21, 1990) 
(calling for the ―negotiations for the preparation of an effective framework 
convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments, and any 
related legal instruments as might be agreed upon,‖ which led to the UNFCCC).  
6. UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 3(1). 
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commitments, its parties launched a new round of negotiations in 
1995 aimed at strengthening the regime. In 1997, UNFCCC parties 
concluded the Kyoto Protocol (KP),7 a legally binding treaty which 
sets binding emissions targets and timetables for developed countries. 
However, like the Convention, the Protocol contains no requirement 
that developing countries cut emissions. For these and other reasons 
the U.S., the largest historical emitter of GHGs, refused to ratify the 
Protocol and thus seriously undermined its effectiveness. Under 
growing pressure to develop a new arrangement that could either 
extend, amend, or replace the Kyoto Protocol, in 2007, the UNFCCC 
parties, including the United States, agreed in the Bali Action Plan on 
a roadmap for a post-2012 climate agreement.8 
The Bali Action Plan was negotiated against the backdrop of U.S. 
inaction, potential widespread noncompliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol by other developed countries, and growing emissions from 
major emerging countries. It called for enhanced national and 
international action on mitigation of climate change, including 
commitments by developed countries and, significantly, ―nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions‖ (NAMAs) by developing countries. It 
called upon parties to conclude their negotiations with an agreed 
outcome by COP-15 but did not indicate whether that outcome would 
be in the form of a legally binding instrument. 
In the lead up to the Copenhagen COP, an informal group of 
seventeen of the world’s largest emitters of GHGs9 launched the 
―Major Economies Forum‖ (MEF).10 In July 2009, MEF leaders 
signaled an apparently radical departure from previous climate 
agreements. They (1) recognized that, in order to prevent the global 
 
7. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
8. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Thirteenth Sess., Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision 
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter Bali Action Plan], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/co 
p13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3. 
9. These include: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, 
South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
10. Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, Declaration of the 
Leaders: The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-first-leaders-meeting.html 
[hereinafter MEF Declaration].  
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mean temperature from rising more than two degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels, global emissions must drop substantially by 
2050;11 and (2) declared that they will ―undertake transparent 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions, subject to applicable 
measurement, reporting, and verification, and prepare low-carbon 
growth plans.‖12 Developing major economies also, for the first time, 
pledged to ―promptly undertake actions whose projected effects on 
emissions represent a meaningful deviation from business as usual in 
the midterm . . . .‖13 
The MEF Declaration raised expectations that a Copenhagen 
agreement could demonstrate how all major economies will take 
actions to reduce global emissions by more than fifty percent by 2020 
and by more than eighty percent by 2050. If so, for the first time, 
both developed and developing countries would need to design, 
declare, and be held accountable for either NAMAs or commitments 
that put humanity on track towards a low-carbon future. However, as 
Copenhagen approached, the MEF statements also began to reveal 
emerging views on legal form and review procedures that would 
represent a significant retreat from a UNFCCC process that had been 
premised on the importance of a legally binding instrument. By the 
time they met in London in October 2009, MEF leaders had begun to 
describe their goal as merely to ―internationalize‖ domestic climate 
policies in the form of ―listings‖ subject only to a party-led peer-
review process.14 As COP-15 approached, both the UN Secretary 
General and the Danish government, which would play host for and 
preside over the Copenhagen COP, picked up on the MEF signals and 
began to lower expectations as to the legal character of any COP-15 
outcome.15 
Over a hundred heads of state and government arrived in the last 
days of COP-15 to discover their delegations deadlocked. The 
 
11. Id. para. 1  
12. Id.  
13. Id.  
14. The Fifth Leaders’ Representative Meeting, Major Economies Forum on 
Energy and Climate Changes, London, U.K., Oct. 18–19, 2009, Chair’s Summary: 
Fifth Meeting of the Leaders’ Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on 
Energy and Climate, available at http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-
meetings/the-fifth-leaders-representatives-meeting.html. 
15. Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Lowers Expectations for Copenhagen Climate 
Deal, REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59P4YY20 
091026.  
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Copenhagen Accord16 was hammered out in the last hours among five 
governments that are key to the future of the climate regime (the U.S. 
and the BASIC countries) and with a shared reluctance to make 
specific commitments.17 When the Accord was brought back to the 
conference as a whole, those that felt excluded from the process and 
disappointed with the results blocked the consensus necessary (in the 
absence of majority voting rules) to adopt the Accord as a COP 
decision. Thus, at the end of COP-15, the Accord was given no 
official status as a UNFCCC document. It was merely taken note of.18 
Setting aside issues of its legal status, the Accord contains 
substance of some significance. It can be read to commit the 
countries that agree to it to acting collectively to dramatically reduce 
their emissions in such a way that will limit global warming to no 
more than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels—an 
achievement that many scientists believe is essential to avoid the 
most dangerous impacts of global warming. In keeping with the 
UNFCCC’s and KP’s principles of differentiation, it calls upon 
developed countries to ―commit to implement individually or jointly 
the quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020‖ and to 
submit these for inclusion in Appendix I of the Accord.19 It calls upon 
developing countries to ―implement mitigation actions‖ and to submit 
these for inclusion in Appendix II.20 It also contains pledges by 
developed countries to provide up to $30 billion in finance to reduce 
emissions and build resilience to climate impacts in developing 
countries in the near term and $100 billion a year by 2020.21 
The Accord and its appendices of targets and actions differentiate 
between developed and developing countries—although the gap has 
closed dramatically. They are not, however, legally binding.22 Indeed, 
 
16. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2. 
17. Arthur Max, UN Climate Envoy Expects Dual-Track Negotiations, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ 
ALeqM5jgEChLfSlnFM9sVxr1mcG_iYxHvgD9EFPGC00. 
18. Id.  
19. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
20. Id. para. 5 (emphasis added). 
21. Id. para. 8. 
22. In a series of notes to the parties following the adoption of the Accord, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat addressed questions raised about the legal character of the 
accord by clarifying that,  
since the Conference of the Parties neither adopted nor endorsed the Accord, 
but merely took note of it, its provisions do not have any legal standing 
within the UNFCCC process even if some Parties decide to associate 
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a sentence in an early draft that would have called on parties to 
convert these pledges into legal text at the next COP was removed 
because of China’s refusal to contemplate legally binding 
commitments and the U.S. refusal to be bound without China.23 But 
the Accord is politically binding on those countries that choose to 
support it, and dozens of delegations publicly expressed their 
approval of it during the final COP plenary session. Politically 
binding—if it means anything—means that political consequences 
will flow from its breach. These could include, for example, 
diplomatic responses, efforts at public shaming, or the withholding of 
discretionary funding. In this sense, the Accord can be considered a 
strong, high-level commitment by the countries that have adhered to 
it. 
The Accord also describes itself as ―operational immediately.‖24 
This language was included in the Accord by parties that had hoped it 
would be adopted as a COP decision in Copenhagen. Because it was 
not, those parts of the Accord that would require a COP decision 
cannot be operationalized.25 
The chaos of the final COP plenary session and the confused state 
of the Accord’s text left many doubts as to how many and which 
countries would, in the end, support the Accord. The Accord set a 
deadline of 31 January 2010 for countries to submit targets and 
actions to be included in the Accord’s appendices.26 When the 
Accord’s deadline passed, 95 of the UN Framework Convention’s 
192 Parties had responded. Of these, thirty-eight developed countries 
and twenty-seven developing countries lodged their targets and 
 
themselves with it. . . . [T]he accord is a political agreement rather than a 
treaty instrument . . . .  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Executive Secretary, 
Bonn, F.R.G., Jan. 25, 2010, Notification to Parties: Clarification Relating to the 
Notification of 18 January 2010, available at http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and 
_observers/notifications/application/pdf/100125_noti_clarification.pdf. 
23. See generally TREVOR HOUSER, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., POLICY 
BRIEF: COPENHAGEN, THE ACCORD AND THE WAY FORWARD 6–7 (2010), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb10-05.pdf. 
24. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, pmbl. 
25. For example, the Accord purports to decide to establish a ―Copenhagen 
Green Climate Fund‖ as an operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial 
mechanism; this can only be done by a COP decision. Id. para. 10.  
26. Id. para. 4. 
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actions with the United Nations.27 
The UNFCCC Secretariat, with support from the Danish COP 
Presidency and the UN Secretary General, also invited each party to 
the UNFCCC to send it an official communication indicating whether 
it wished to ―associate itself with the Accord and that its name should 
be included in the chapeau of the Accord.‖28 Some influential 
commentators who objected to the Accord’s content and the process 
of its adoption sought to discourage countries—particularly 
developing countries—from formally associating themselves with the 
Accord on the grounds that this might imbue the document with a 
legally binding character.29 
Some of the BASIC countries, particularly India and China, were 
demonstrably reluctant to respond to the Secretariat’s request. Even 
after having submitted their actions for inclusion in Appendix II, both 
countries did so without reference to the Accord, preferring instead to 
make reference to provisions in the UNFCCC which encourage 
countries to report on their policies and measures.30 Since then, 
following further requests for clarification from the Secretariat, both 
 
27. See U.S. Climate Action Network, Who’s on Board with the Copenhagen 
Accord, http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2010). These pledges fall well short of the deep cuts in 
emissions that will be necessary to keep global temperatures at safe levels. Kelly 
Kevin & Rob Bradley, Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges 2 
(World Resource Inst., Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_p
ledges_2010-02-01.pdf.  
28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Executive 
Secretary, Bonn, F.R.G., Jan. 18, 2010, Notification to Parties: Communication of 
Information Relating to the Copenhagen Accord, available at http://unfccc.int/files/ 
parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/notification_to_parties_201001
18.pdf. The chapeau of the Accord contains a set of square brackets around the 
words ―List of Parties‖ which the Secretariat has since been seeking to fill, 
retroactively, with the permission of each UNFCCC party. 
29. ―[A]ssociation with the Copenhagen Accord in writing, as requested by the 
Danish Presidency, would essentially be a unilateral declaration on the part of the 
associating Party of its willingness to be bound – in both political and international 
law terms – to the provisions of the Copenhagen Accord.‖ SOUTH CENTRE, 
COMMENTS ON THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD: SUMMARY, Jan. 18, 2010, 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121
6%3Acomments-on-the-copenhagen-accord&catid=129%3Aclimate-change-&It 
emid=67&lang=en. 
30. Letter from SU Wei, Director General, Department of Climate Change, 
National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Yvo de Boer, 
Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat (Jan. 28, 2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/chinacphaccord_app2.pdf. 
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China and India have agreed to have their names included in the 
Accord’s chapeau.31 However, neither country has chosen to state that 
it is ―associating‖ with the Accord. 
While these most recent responses to the Accord are promising, 
developing country major economies have treated the issue of its 
legal character skittishly, from their refusal to adopt it as a COP 
decision to their reluctance to ―associate‖ with it. Understanding this 
reluctance and its implications for the future development of the 
climate regime requires a deeper analysis of the meaning of legal 
character for these countries. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL CHARACTER FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY MAJOR ECONOMIES 
In this uncertain context, this Article seeks to draw conclusions 
about the relevance of legal character for developing country major 
economies (see Box 1). It is likely that an agreement subsequent to 
Copenhagen will continue to maintain a ―development divide‖ that 
reflects significant distinctions in the commitments of developed and 
developing countries. It is also possible, however, that an agreed 
outcome will, as the Copenhagen Accord begins to do, significantly 
blur the previously bright lines that have distinguished the obligations 
of these two groups of countries. There will be considerable pressure 
on developing country major economies in general, and on the larger 
emitters among them in particular, to take on actions that are more 
closely comparable in their legal character to the commitments of 
industrialized countries. This pressure will build through a 
combination of international negotiations, bilateral diplomacy, and 
unilateral domestic policies aimed at addressing ―competitiveness 
concerns‖ between those countries that are undertaking caps and 
those that are not. Industrialized countries will continue to push hard 
under the UNFCCC and through multiple other forums—such as the 
MEF and the G-20—to secure what they view as ―comparable‖ 
commitments from major economies that are non-Annex I Parties to 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, including with regard to the 
legal form of those commitments. In its first formal submission post-
Copenhagen, the U.S. has, for example, stated that it ―supports a 
 
31. See, e.g., Letter from SU Wei, Director General, Department of Climate 
Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Yvo de Boer, 
Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat (Mar. 9, 2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/indiacphaccord.pdf. 
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legally binding outcome in Mexico provided that the legally binding 
elements in an otherwise acceptable agreement would apply in a 
symmetrical manner to all major economies.‖32  
 
Box 1: CO2 Emissions and Development in the Major Economies Forum 
 
 
 
CO2 
Emissions 
Per Capita 
 
 
2004 
 
(Metric tons 
/ person) 
Total CO2 
Emissions 
 
 
 
2004 
 
(1,000,000 
metric tons) 
UNDP 
Human 
Developm-
ent Index 
 
2006 
 
(2006 
ranking) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 
 
 
2006 
 
(PPP US$) 
United 
States
abc 
19.84 5,889 15 43,968 
Australia
abc 17.48 351 4 33,035 
Canada
abc 17.18 549 3 36,687 
Russia
ac 10.89 1,575 73 13,205 
Rep. of 
Korea
bc 
10.63 507 25 22,985 
Germany
abc 10.37 857 23 31,766 
Japan
abc 10.21 1,304 8 31,951 
United 
Kingdom
abc 
9.19 551 21 32,654 
South Africa
c 9.00 428 125 9,087 
Italy
abc 8.25 482 19 28,828 
France
abc 6.54 397 11 31,980 
China
c 4.23 5,205 94 4,682 
Mexico
bc 4.02 415 51 12,176 
Brazil
c 1.88 346 70 8,949 
Indonesia
c 1.65 368 109 3,455 
India
c 1.07 1,199 132 2,489 
a
Annex I; 
b
OECD; 
c
G20 
Sources: WRI Earthtrends; UNDP Human Development Report 2008. 
 
32. U.S. Submission to Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 3, at 50. 
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The actions to which a developing country major economy may 
agree will be based on what it can afford, politically and 
economically, to undertake domestically and vis-a-vis its economic 
competitors. Where does a country wish to position itself 
geopolitically, now and in the coming decades, in relation to its peers 
on either side of the ―development divide‖? There is a great deal of 
unclaimed space for leadership in the climate change negotiations. 
Supporting high standards with regard to the legal form, content, and 
institutional and procedural oversight of all parties’ undertakings 
would be consistent with leadership. Such leadership would signal 
support for multilateralism and the rule of law and could generate 
significant goodwill from the international community. Given the soft 
consequences that typically flow from the breach of an MEA and the 
growing appetite of some developed countries for unilateral trade and 
investment measures to address ―competitiveness concerns,‖33 the 
rewards of undertaking a binding commitment may prove higher than 
the risks. 
Ultimately, the position a country takes on the legal character of an 
international agreement it intends to join involves a calculation about 
the redistribution of sovereignty. Is it willing to consent to a 
constraint on its own sovereignty in exchange for a reciprocal 
constraint on the sovereignty of other parties? Does the problem that 
the international agreement intends to solve depend upon these 
constraints? These are questions each party needs to assess in the 
context of a highly dynamic process. 
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CHARACTER 
In general, the legal character of an international agreement is 
reflected in its form, its content, and the institutions and procedures 
established to promote compliance with, and enforcement of, its 
terms. A legally binding treaty containing specific and enforceable 
obligations is the highest form of expression of political commitment 
and will at the international level. Ratifying such a treaty signals a 
party’s serious intent to comply with the treaty’s terms and, in return, 
can generate reciprocity and good will—elements essential to 
improve ratification of and compliance with a treaty. However, even 
if the negotiations lead eventually to a legally binding agreement, it 
may not result in legally binding commitments for all parties and will 
 
33. See infra Part VII. 
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likely contain commitments of a highly differentiated content (see 
Box 2).  
One potential outcome of the ongoing negotiations is a legally 
binding agreement that would be open for ratification by all parties. 
However, not all ―legally binding‖ agreements contain clear and 
enforceable commitments.  
In practice, states regularly enter into agreements that take a 
legally binding form but are softly worded, vague, and in some 
circumstances unenforceable. For example, under proposals 
submitted by UNFCCC parties prior to Copenhagen, a legally 
binding instrument could, (1) for some or all parties, contain 
discretionary ―pledges‖ of actions that are not expressed in legally 
binding language; (2) for some or all parties, provide for no 
mechanisms to review or enforce compliance; (3) for developing 
country parties, make the performance of their NAMAs contingent on 
developed countries meeting their obligations to provide financial 
support; and/or (4) limit some or all parties’ commitments to 
performance ―in conformity with domestic law‖ and allow those 
parties to change domestic law without incurring international legal 
consequences.34 
A.  Understanding the Legal Character of a Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement 
Major, contemporary MEAs35 are most commonly expressed in 
legally binding treaty form as ―conventions‖ and ―protocols‖ to those 
conventions.36 Typically, these MEAs incorporate the formal legal 
elements of treaties, most notably final clauses that include 
provisions for signature, ratification, accession, approval, and 
withdrawal recognized by international treaty law and customary law 
as a means of expressing and withdrawing consent to be bound.37 
 
34. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Sixth 
Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., June 1–12, 2009, Revised Negotiating Text: Note by the 
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1 (June 22, 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/inf01.pdf. 
35. We use the term MEA in this Article to refer to legally binding treaties, not 
―soft law‖ instruments such as ministerial declarations. 
36. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 
79. 
37. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 11, 54, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLOT]. 
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In terms of their content, many MEAs, including the UNFCCC and 
the KP, contain highly differentiated commitments that vary widely 
with regard to their legal form, clarity, specificity, and ambition. 
Commitments within MEAs can be expressed in either mandatory or 
discretionary language. They can be understood as obligations of 
conduct, which include obligations to cooperate, prepare programs, 
report on progress, or promote public awareness of issues; and 
obligations of result, which require parties to achieve measurable, 
reportable, and verifiable results, for example, through specific 
targets and timetables. Thus, many contemporary MEAs contain 
differentiated commitments, which allow parties to the same binding 
treaty to have commitments that differ in their legal form as well as 
their clarity, specificity, and ambition. 
In some cases, even though commitments in a treaty are legally 
binding in their form (e.g., they are described as commitments, use 
mandatory language, and are contained in a legally binding treaty), 
they may have very little legal effect at the international level. If the 
language in which they are expressed is vague and imprecise, 
assessing compliance becomes difficult. In these cases, binding text 
may in effect be unenforceable at the international level. 
Nevertheless, for many countries, the international legal character of 
an MEA will trigger domestic ratification procedures, rooting the 
agreement in domestic legal and political process and, in some 
circumstances, triggering the enactment of enabling legislation. The 
domestic legal effect of an international treaty can be more 
significant than what is reflected in the international instrument. 
The accountability of a party under an MEA depends on the 
institutions and procedures the agreement establishes to promote 
implementation by monitoring, reviewing, and promoting compliance 
with their commitments. Many contemporary MEAs require parties 
to report on their progress and establish a process to review these 
reports. Some contemporary MEAs have established multilateral 
procedures and institutions that promote compliance with their terms 
by offering financial and technical assistance. This assistance is 
typically limited to eligible developing country parties or parties with 
―economies in transition‖ (EITs) to market economies. 
A few of these compliance procedures are authorized to reach 
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conclusions as to whether a party is in noncompliance and 
recommend the suspension of rights and privileges under the MEAs.38 
Some MEAs also require, authorize, or provide a basis for justifying 
the use of unilateral trade measures by one party against another 
party for failure to comply with their terms. 
Many contemporary MEAs, including the UNFCCC and the KP, 
provide for ―latent‖ binding arbitration, judicial dispute settlement, or 
compulsory but nonbinding conciliation as the means of settling 
disputes that arise between parties. Many MEAs, like the UNFCCC 
and the KP, provide for ―optional clauses‖ that allow parties to opt 
into compulsory and binding judicial dispute settlement. However, no 
contemporary MEA has required parties, when ratifying the 
agreement, to subject themselves to a compulsory and binding 
judicial dispute-settlement procedure, and no party to a contemporary 
MEA has done so.39 
B.  What If a Country Breaches a Legally Binding Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement? 
Although it remains rare for an MEA to provide for compulsory 
and binding enforcement procedures and define specific remedies and 
consequences for breach, it remains an important principle of 
international law—perhaps the most important principle—that breach 
of an international treaty gives rise to state responsibility for the 
consequences of that breach. 
All internationally binding agreements are governed by the 
principle of ―pacta sunt servanda‖ meaning that ―[e]very treaty in 
force is binding upon the Parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith.‖40 Essentially, this is a statement of the ―rule of law‖ in 
international relations. Customary international law is emerging to 
suggest that the breach of an international obligation, including an 
international treaty obligation, is an internationally wrongful act that 
 
38. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER: THE 
VIENNA CONVENTION (1985), THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL (1987) 296 (6th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter Ozone Handbook], available at http://www.unep.org/Ozone/pdfs/Ha 
ndbook-2003.pdf. 
39. The exception, if it is to be considered an MEA, is the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, which provides for compulsory and binding judicial dispute 
settlement. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 286, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261. 
40. VCLOT, supra note 37, art. 26. 
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gives rise to state responsibility to make restitution for the 
consequences of that breach.41 Parties to an MEA may agree in 
advance what specific consequences will flow from the breach of a 
particular provision of a treaty. As will be mentioned, the KP’s 
―enforcement consequences‖ as well as the trade bans in other 
MEAs, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,42 are rare but important examples of 
such pre-defined enforcement consequences.43 
C.  What Is the Value of a Legally Binding Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement Without Strong Enforcement 
Procedures? 
In the absence of strong enforcement procedures and 
consequences, MEAs can promote accountability by establishing 
institutions and procedures with the authority to receive, analyze, and 
report information on parties’ activities. A data-rich environment 
enables parties to build trust through verification and exercise the 
kind of diplomatic pressure—sometimes referred to as ―shaming‖—
that is an essential means of promoting accountability among 
countries. 
Contemporary MEAs continue to rely heavily on transparency of 
information and multilateral diplomatic processes for accountability. 
For eligible parties, they also rely on technical and financial 
assistance, rather than legal formalism, to promote compliance with 
their terms. The formalities associated with a legally binding regime 
can, however, operate to exclude parties, including parties crucial to 
the MEA’s effectiveness, from participating in the regime. Domestic 
ratification processes can slow or prevent a country from formally 
joining a regime. 
The binding character of an MEA under international law is 
properly understood as an expression of the highest level of political 
will of the parties to achieve its objectives. While legally binding 
 
41. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 
at 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
42. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. 
43. Chatham House, Sustainable Development Programme, The CITES Treaty 
and Compliance: Progress or Jeopardy? 4 BP 04/01 (Sept. 2004) (prepared by 
Rosalind Reeve), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9267_bp09 
04cites.pdf. 
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form need not include legally binding content for all parties, it does 
tend to generate the more sophisticated and robust institutions and 
procedures necessary to support transparency and accountability of 
performance. The legally binding nature of an agreement correlates, 
for example, with the budgets and political clout of the institutions 
associated with these regimes, including their ability to attract 
financial support, the attention of high level representation, media 
attention, and the support of civil society and the public at large. 
V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL CHARACTER UNDER THE CLIMATE 
CHANGE REGIME 
A.  The UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC and KP have in many ways followed the form, 
content, and procedural and institutional characteristics of the ozone-
layer-protection regime, widely regarded as among the most 
successful MEAs.44 The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer45 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer46 forged a legally binding set of 
schedules for the phase out of the consumption and production of 
chemicals that threaten the stratospheric shield that protects life on 
earth from ultraviolet radiation. In two decades, its legal framework 
of commitments, financial and technical support, and compliance 
system led developed and developing countries to dispose of 
stockpiles, transform industrial processes, and dramatically reverse 
the deterioration of the ozone layer. 
Like the Vienna Ozone Convention, the UNFCCC is a 
―framework‖ treaty. It is legally binding in its form and relatively 
weak in its content but provides for quite robust procedures and 
institutions, including the means to enhance its commitments through 
 
44. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 345–46 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the Montreal Protocol as ―a landmark 
international environmental agreement, providing a precedent for new regulatory 
techniques and institutional arrangements‖); PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 522–23 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that 
―the Ozone Convention and the Montreal Protocol have provided one of the most 
sophisticated and effective models of international regulation and supervision for 
environmental purposes‖). 
45. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention]. 
46. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 16 
1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal 
Protocol]. 
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the adoption of protocols. As a ratifiable international agreement, the 
Convention provides a legally binding framework that sets out an 
overall objective, a set of principles, a series of procedural 
obligations, and a set of institutions designed to oversee the 
implementation and development of the regime. Those commitments 
that are applicable to all parties are general obligations of conduct, 
including the commitment to develop national climate programs and 
national emissions inventories and report these to the COP. 
The UNFCCC also contains a softly worded ―aim‖ which suggests 
that developed (Annex I) parties should return their GHG emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2000. It establishes a financial mechanism to 
support the incremental costs of developing country implementation 
of their commitments. Annex I parties that were also members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
in 1992 (Annex II parties) are required to provide an unspecified 
amount of ―new and additional‖ financial resources to the 
UNFCCC’s financial mechanism. 
All parties are required to develop national inventories of GHGs 
and to formulate and implement national programs containing 
measures to mitigate emissions and facilitate adaptation to climate 
change. This information is to be communicated to the COP, which is 
mandated to: 
[a]ssess, on the basis of all information made available to it in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the 
implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the overall 
effects of the measures taken pursuant to the Convention, in 
particular environmental, economic and social effects as well 
as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress 
towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved.47 
The commitments of non-Annex I parties under the UNFCCC and 
the KP are, in the view of some parties, contingent upon the 
fulfillment of Annex II parties of their obligation to provide new and 
additional funding to support developing country implementation.48 
 
47. UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 7.2(e). 
48. Id. art. 4.7 (providing that ―[t]he extent to which developing country Parties 
will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on 
the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments 
under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and 
will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty 
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Arguably, this contingency affects the legally binding character of 
developing country commitments by tying it to the performance of 
other parties in providing finance. 
The national communications and national GHG inventories of 
Annex I parties have become subject to an expert review process 
under the UNFCCC, which, at least in theory, provides an 
opportunity for the COP or its Subsidiary Body for Implementation to 
assess the implementation of individual Annex I parties.49 The COP’s 
failure to ever assess a country’s implementation arguably 
undermines an aspect of the legally binding character of parties’ 
commitments by signaling that parties are reluctant to hold each other 
to account for noncompliance. 
The UNFCCC has a set of final clauses that include standard 
language on dispute settlement including articles on judicial dispute 
settlement and arbitration. Those parties that agree, either in general 
or when a specific dispute arises, to subject themselves to these 
procedures, the dispute will be resolved with a legally binding 
judgment. The UNFCCC also provides for a conciliation process, 
which has compulsory jurisdiction over all parties but will operate 
only when triggered by one party against another and can only 
―render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in 
good faith.‖50 None of these procedures has been invoked. 
The UNFCCC parties negotiated and nearly completed the design 
of a Multilateral Consultative Process (MCP), based largely on the 
Montreal Protocol’s noncompliance system, which would have 
facilitated compliance with the UNFCCC. The MCP was never 
finalized, as the negotiations of the KP were seen to overtake the 
need for a compliance system under the UNFCCC.51 
B.  The Kyoto Protocol 
The KP develops the climate regime further through the 
introduction of quantified emissions limitations and reduction 
objectives (QELROs) for Annex I parties, which are specific, time-
bound ―obligations of result.‖ Each Annex I party is provided an 
 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country 
Parties‖).  
49. Id. art. 10.2(b). 
50. Id. art. 14.6. 
51. Id. art. 13. 
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―assigned amount‖ of GHG emissions it is allowed during the KP’s 
commitment period of 2008 to 2012. The KP’s ―flexibility‖ 
mechanisms are designed to reduce the costs to developed countries 
of remaining within their assigned amounts by allowing them to trade 
allowances among themselves and acquire offsets through 
investments in GHG-reduction projects in developing countries. The 
KP enhances the UNFCCC’s procedures and institutions for 
reviewing the performance of Annex I parties and establishes a 
compliance procedure designed both to facilitate and to enforce 
compliance with its terms. Like the UNFCCC, the KP has a dispute 
settlement procedure that would become operational only if parties 
choose to opt into it. 
The delegations that led the design of the Kyoto Protocol followed 
the principle that more specific commitments and functioning 
flexibility mechanisms required a more robust compliance system to 
ensure accountability among parties and predictability for investors. 
More particularly, they argued that an international emissions trading 
system should be backed by a compliance system with an 
enforcement mechanism. This logic led the negotiators to enhance 
accountability by improving the procedures for carrying out expert 
review of developed country inventories and national 
communications. Expert Review Teams, operating under the auspices 
of the UNFCCC Secretariat, are authorized to carry out in-depth 
reviews of the quality of reported data and can raise questions of 
implementation with regard to a party’s performance. 
The logic behind legally binding commitments also led to a 
mandate, under Article 18 of the KP, to: 
approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms 
to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Protocol, including through the development 
of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the 
cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any 
procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing 
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an 
amendment to this Protocol.52 
This mandate proved to be both an engine of innovation and a 
 
52. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, art. 18.  
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brake on the legal integrity of the KP. The Marrakesh Accords53 to 
the KP put in place a Compliance System that is authorized to review 
questions of implementation raised (either by the Expert Review 
Teams or by a party) with regard to the performance of both 
developing and developed parties. A question raised by or with 
regard to a developing country party is referred to the ―Facilitative 
Branch‖ of the KP’s Compliance Committee, which can provide 
advice and assistance to that party.  
A question of implementation raised with regard to a developed 
country’s compliance with its obligation to report and comply with its 
QELROs can, if substantiated, be referred to the Compliance 
Committee’s ―Enforcement Branch.‖ If, during the KP’s commitment 
period, the Enforcement Branch finds that a party is not in 
compliance with its obligation to report on its national GHG 
emissions, the Enforcement Branch can suspend that party’s 
eligibility to engage in the KP’s market mechanisms. If, at the end of 
the KP’s commitment period, a party, having been given a chance to 
purchase additional offsets or allowances, still exceeds its assigned 
amount, the Enforcement Branch can require that party to deduct 1.3 
tonnes of carbon equivalent emissions from the subsequent 
commitment period for each tonne that exceeds its assigned amount. 
The KP’s compliance system was adopted as part of the Marrakesh 
Accords in 2001 as a set of decisions taken by the UNFCCC COP in 
preparation for the entry into force of the KP, following which both 
branches of the Compliance Committee have begun operations. 
Indeed, the Enforcement Branch has dealt with two cases of potential 
noncompliance—both of which resulted in the improved performance 
of the parties in question.54 
However, the enforcement consequences associated with the 
 
53. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Seventh Sess., Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29–Nov. 10, 2001, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, held at Marrakesh 
from 29 October to 10 November 2009—Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) 
[hereinafter Marrakesh Accords], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop 
7/13a02.pdf. 
54. See René Lefeber, The Practice of the Compliance Committee Under the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(2006–2007), in NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 303 (Tullio 
Treves et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Non-Compliance Procedures 2009]. 
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findings of noncompliance—the suspension of the eligibility to 
participate in the Kyoto Protocol’s ―flexibility mechanisms‖ and the 
imposition of the thirty percent penalty—were never ―adopted by 
means of amendment‖ to the Kyoto Protocol, as required by Article 
18. Furthermore, the KP parties have yet to agree on their Assigned 
Amounts for the second commitment period. This leaves open the 
real possibility that, if a party were found by the Enforcement Branch 
not to be in compliance at the end of the KP’s commitment period, 
the enforcement penalties would be nonoperational. 
C.  Lessons for a Climate Change Agreement 
Legally binding form, specific content, and robust institutions and 
procedures were justified under the Kyoto Protocol by arguments that 
linked the rule of law to environmental integrity, mutual 
accountability, and the carbon market’s need for stability and 
predictability. By linking the legal form of parties’ commitments to 
specificity of content and robustness of institutions and process, the 
KP climate change regime has introduced significant innovations to 
international environmental law.55 
There are several noteworthy successes. First, transparency and 
accountability have been improved through the monitoring and 
evaluation of developed country parties’ performance by Expert 
Review Teams authorized to conduct in-country visits, deploy third-
party data, and raise questions of implementation. Second, the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility has been 
implemented through the split functions and jurisdictions of the 
facilitative and enforcement branches in a way that gained the 
acceptance by both developed and developing countries of enhanced 
oversight of their performance. Third, while it is operating on 
somewhat unstable legal grounds due to the language in Article 18, 
the KP’s Compliance System is developing an important track record 
in promoting compliance.  
This suggests that a climate change agreement designed as an 
 
55. Jacob Werksman, The Negotiations of a Kyoto Compliance System, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 17–37 (Olav 
Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2005); Geir Ulfstein & Jacob 
Werksman, The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 39–62 (Olav 
Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2005). 
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advance on the KP should maintain a logical link between form, 
content, and procedures but should also seek to reach agreement on 
the consequences for noncompliance within the ratifiable instrument 
that contains the new commitments. 
Market mechanisms are creatively used under the KP to both 
reduce the costs of compliance and—through the threat of suspension 
of the ability to trade—create incentives for compliance. International 
emissions trading between Annex I countries depends upon the 
legally binding character of their QELROs to create assigned amount 
units that would be fungible across different domestic legal systems. 
Offset trading based on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
depends on project-level contracts, enforceable through a mixture of 
domestic legal systems, international arbitration, and, indirectly, 
decisions made by the CDM Executive Board. The legal and 
institutional character of the CDM arrangements have been essential 
to providing credibility and predictability to buyers and sellers, as 
well as environmental integrity to the system as a whole. If a climate 
change agreement also relies on carbon markets, whether at the 
allowance, project, or sectoral level, similar kinds of arrangements 
will be necessary. Indeed, the emissions reduction purchase 
agreements (ERPAs) and the CDM Executive Board’s mandate to 
approve project baselines and certify emissions reductions, by 
providing a legal and institutional framework for project-level 
performance of developing countries, may provide a prototype for the 
kind of results-based, measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) 
manner anticipated under the climate change negotiations.56 
As discussed later, it is not clear that the Bali Action Plan and the 
subsequent negotiations are taking a path similar to the KP with 
regard to the legal character of a post-2012 agreement and its 
multilaterally agreed approach to carbon markets. As was described 
above, some developed countries have rejected what they see as the 
KP’s heavily ―top-down‖ approach. Others that championed the need 
for strong rules and institutions during the KP negotiations have been 
disappointed by the performance of parties and the institutions 
created under the KP. Efforts by developed countries to include more 
specific commitments by major developing economies in a climate 
 
56. See DAVID FREESTONE & CHARLOTTE STRECK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 295–
377 (2005). 
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change agreement have also dampened the enthusiasm of developing 
countries for a legally binding regime with a tough compliance 
mechanism. Some have begun to emphasize the need for a greater 
focus on the legal character of domestic rules and the capacity of 
national institutions as the main engines of implementing and 
enforcing climate change policy. 
VI. BALI, COPENHAGEN, AND THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF A FUTURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 
In the absence of a COP decision in Copenhagen, the COP’s 
decisions in Bali, as informed by the Copenhagen Accord, will guide 
the climate change negotiations going forward. Together, they leave 
unsettled the legal form, content, and institutional and procedural 
dimensions of a future climate change agreement. However, they do 
contain two major breakthroughs that could have implications for the 
legal character of the post-2012 regime and that have been reflected 
and developed further in the Copenhagen Accord. First, the Bali 
Action Plan (BAP) set the expectation that all parties to a climate 
change agreement, developed and developing, will demonstrate how 
they are contributing to the UNFCCC’s objective. This expectation 
has now been at least partially fulfilled by the pledges of developed 
country targets and developing country actions in the Accord’s 
appendices. Second, the Bali Action Plan and the Accord have 
confirmed the expectation that all parties describe the content of their 
commitments and actions in an MRV manner. 
A.  Legal Form 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol provide for four types of 
―related legal instruments‖—protocols, amendments, annexes, and 
amendments to annexes. Each of these would be legally binding on 
the parties that ratified the respective instrument. As has been 
described, many parties continue to aspire for the negotiations to lead 
to a new treaty, an amendment of the UNFCCC or KP, or both. 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) also has the ability to reach decisions 
and, in the past, has provided fora for the adoption of ―Ministerial 
Declarations.‖ While mainstream interpretations of international law 
do not view such decisions of COPs as legally binding on parties, 
they have had important political and legal effects on parties’ 
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commitments.57 
The Marrakesh Accords to the Kyoto Protocol, for example, 
contain authoritative interpretations, clarifications, and elaborations 
of the KP’s text. Most significantly, the CMP’s interpretations of the 
appropriate method for calculating emissions from Land Use, Land 
Use Change, and Forestry had specific and direct consequences for 
the levels of emissions reductions expected of certain forested 
countries. Detailed rules for the implementation of the CDM were 
adopted by decision and led to the operationalization of the CDM and 
the authorization of the CDM Executive Board to take authoritative 
decisions that determine which methods and projects will generate 
offsets. 
Thus, past practice under the UNFCCC and the KP sets a 
precedent for COP and CMP decisions to interpret and advance 
significantly the implementation of existing commitments but not to 
create new, legally binding commitments. One possible next step in 
the negotiations would be for the UNFCCC COP to reach the 
consensus it failed to reach in Copenhagen and adopt the Accord, or 
much of its content, as a decision. While this would not convert its 
content into a legally binding form, it would allow the parties to 
―operationalize‖ those aspects of the Accord that are within the 
COP’s authority, such as the establishment of a new financial 
mechanism. 
B.  Content 
The BAP and the Accord differentiate between the outcomes 
expected for developed countries and those expected for developing 
countries that will be parties to a post-Copenhagen agreement. The 
BAP does make clear, however, that developed countries are 
expected to emerge with ―[m]easurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives 
[QELRCs] . . . while ensuring the comparability of efforts among 
them, taking into account differences in their national 
circumstances.‖58 The Accord provides more precision by indicating 
that developed (more specifically Annex I) countries will ―commit to 
 
57. Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 24–26 (2002). 
58. Bali Action Plan, supra note 8, para. 1(b)(i). 
WERKSMAN MACRO - 05-11-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  3:53 PM 
134 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:109 
implement individually or jointly the quantified economy-wide 
emissions targets for 2020,‖59 and these have since been included in 
the Accord’s Appendix I. A full analysis of these submissions is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but even a superficial review can 
identify a wide range of differences. While there is consistency 
across submissions with regard to their specificity, the target pledged 
by the European Union represents a twenty percent cut of emissions 
from 1990 levels by 2020 and is enshrined in binding legislation. The 
target pledged by the United States represents a seventeen percent cut 
of emissions from 2005 levels and is based on draft legislation whose 
prospects for passing diminish daily. 
In the Bali Action Plan, developing country parties will, by 
contrast, emerge with ―[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions 
[NAMAs] . . . in the context of sustainable development, supported 
and enabled by technology, financing, and capacity-building in a 
measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner.‖60 The Accord 
develops this further by providing that developing (more specifically 
non-Annex I) countries will:  
implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted 
to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in 
Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF 
document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in 
the context of sustainable development. Least developed 
countries and small island developing States may undertake 
actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.61 
The choice of the words ―commitment‖ in the BAP and ―commit 
to implement . . . targets‖ in the Accord to describe the participation 
of developed countries, as contrasted with ―will implement . . . 
actions‖ in the Accord to describe the participation of developing 
countries, is deliberate. This, as well as the Accord’s distinct 
appendices, perpetuates what a number of developing country 
delegations have characterized as an essential ―firewall‖ or 
―development divide‖ between rich and poor countries. Arguably, the 
use of different terms could draw a line, in the future, between legally 
binding obligations of result for developed countries and softer 
obligations of conduct—or even nonbinding ―pledges‖—by 
 
59. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
60. Bali Action Plan, supra note 8, para. 1(b)(ii). 
61. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 5. 
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developing countries. The references to Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC 
and the special circumstance of least developed countries and small 
island developing states, as well as the remarks included with many 
developing country submissions to Appendix II of the Accord, 
suggest that performance of at least some of the actions listed will 
remain contingent on whether financial resources are available to 
support those actions. 
If the Accord remains a high water mark for what the negotiations 
are able to achieve, then both developed and developing country 
commitments will simply remain soft law of a different texture. 
Which countries will be considered ―developed‖ and which 
―developing‖ is undetermined by the BAP, while the Accord reverts 
back to the Annex I/non-Annex I division in place since 1992. 
Again, an analysis of Appendix II pledges is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but they appear in great variety and have proved difficult 
to analyze and compare with regard to their ambition and likely 
impact.62 
C.  Institutions and Procedures 
The concept of measuring, reporting, and verifying (MRV) both 
developing country actions and developed country financing of such 
actions also carries with it a strong institutional and procedural 
expectation, raising the question of by whom and how QELRCs, 
financial commitments, NAMAs, targets, and pledges will be 
measured, reviewed, and verified. The BAP does not contain any 
further reference to monitoring, review, or compliance procedures. 
The Accord seeks to move this issue a notch further by providing that 
developed country targets, as well as their financial pledges, ―will be 
measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any 
further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will 
ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust 
and transparent.‖63 
Scrutiny of developing country actions will also be tightened under 
the Accord. Developing country NAMAs that do not receive financial 
support under the Accord will be domestic MRV systems, and the 
 
62. See TARYN FRANSEN, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, SUMMARY OF GHG 
REDUCTION PLEDGES PUT FORWARD BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009), 
http://pdf.wri.org/summary_of_non_annex1_pledges_2009-12.pdf.  
63. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 4. 
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results of this review will be reported to the UN and subjected to 
―international consultations and analysis under clearly defined 
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.‖64 
NAMAs that do receive support ―will be subject to international 
measurement, reporting, and verification in accordance with 
guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.‖65  
These institutions and procedures for MRV represent significant 
advances over existing systems under the UNFCCC, particularly for 
developing countries. They fall well short of the compliance 
procedures as applied to Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. 
It should be noted, however, that these Accord provisions appear to 
require additional actions by the COP and are not, therefore 
―operational immediately.‖66 
VII. UNILATERAL STANDARD SETTING FOR LEGAL CHARACTER: A 
CASE STUDY OF DRAFT U.S. CLIMATE LEGISLATION 
The pressure on developing countries, particularly major 
economies, to strengthen and fulfill the pledges they have made as 
part of the Copenhagen Accord in a way that is comparable in their 
legal character to developed country commitments is likely to grow. 
Bilateral diplomacy will build this pressure further and may well be 
backed by the threat of unilateral, domestic policies aimed at 
addressing ―competitiveness concerns‖ between those countries that 
are undertaking caps and those that are not. Both the U.S. and the 
European Union have been actively considering the use of ―border 
adjustment measures‖ as means of encouraging their major trading 
partners to adopt climate policies that are comparable to theirs. Other 
industrialized countries are taking a wait-and-see approach but may 
be reasonably expected to follow the lead of the world’s largest 
economies. One of the stated objectives of U.S. measures is to 
prevent emissions ―leakage‖ that might occur through the relocation 
of GHG-intensive supply chains and production processes from 
capped to uncapped countries. 
The stated purposes and specific measures contained in the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act67 (ACES) passed by the 
 
64. Id. para. 5. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. pmbl. 
67. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
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U.S. House of Representatives (but not yet enacted into law) are an 
extreme example of a set of legal implications that might arise from 
the legal character of commitments that a country signs up to at a 
post-Copenhagen conference. Similar types of measures have been 
contemplated in more recent draft legislation and proposals emerging 
from the Senate.68 
ACES would, if it became law, set negotiating goals for the U.S. 
delegation that would include: ―induc[ing] foreign countries, and, in 
particular, fast-growing developing countries, to take substantial 
action with respect to their greenhouse gas emissions consistent with 
the Bali Action Plan developed under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.‖69 Furthermore, the bill provides that 
―[i]t is the policy of the U.S. to work proactively under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and in other 
appropriate fora, to establish binding agreements, including sectoral 
agreements, committing all major greenhouse gas-emitting nations to 
contribute equitably to the reduction of global greenhouse gas 
emissions.‖70 
More specifically, under the bill, the U.S. Administration would be 
directed to achieve the following negotiating objectives:  
(1) to reach an internationally binding agreement in which all 
major greenhouse gas-emitting countries contribute equitably 
to the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions; (2) (A) to 
include in such international agreement provisions that 
recognize and address the competitive imbalances that lead to 
carbon leakage and may be created between parties and non-
parties to the agreement in domestic and export markets; and 
(B) not to prevent parties to such agreement from addressing 
the competitive imbalances that lead to carbon leakage and 
may be created by the agreement among parties to the 
agreement in domestic and export markets; and (3) to include 
in such international agreement agreed remedies for any party 
to the agreement that fails to meet its greenhouse gas reduction 
 
68. E.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S.1733, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S.2877, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
69. H.R. 2454 § 401. 
70. Id. 
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obligations in the agreement.71 
Thus, the U.S. would be seeking, in an international agreement, 
comparable efforts from major economies and remedies to enforce 
them. If these negotiating objectives were not met by January 2018, 
ACES would trigger the establishment of a ―border adjustment‖ 
program that could penalize importers of products made by U.S. 
competitors in energy or GHG-intensive, trade-exposed sectors, when 
those products are produced or manufactured in a country that failed 
to meet at least one of several tests. While the detailed methodologies 
of how border measures would be applied to specific products, 
sectors, and countries have not been developed in the bill, these tests 
give an indication of what the U.S. will be looking for in terms of 
―comparability‖ of efforts of its major trading partners:  
(1) The country is a party to an international agreement to 
which the United States is a party that includes a nationally 
enforceable and economy wide greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction commitment for that country that is at least as 
stringent as that of the United States. (2) The country is a party 
to a multilateral or bilateral emission reduction agreement for 
that sector to the [sic] which the United States is a party. (3) 
The country has an annual energy or greenhouse gas 
intensity . . . for the sector that is equal to or less than the 
energy or greenhouse gas intensity for such industrial sector in 
the United States in the most recent calendar year for which 
data are available.72 
It is worth noting that ACES also contains provisions that would 
limit the eligibility of countries to receive U.S. financial assistance 
generated by the bill. Eligibility would be reserved for those 
developing countries that entered into an international agreement to 
which the United States is a party, ―under which such country agrees 
to take actions to produce measurable, reportable, and verifiable 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation‖ or has ―in force national 
policies and measures that are capable of producing measurable, 
reportable, and verifiable greenhouse gas emissions mitigation‖; and 
―has developed a nationally appropriate mitigation strategy that seeks 
to achieve substantial reductions, sequestration, or avoidance of 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  
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greenhouse gas emissions, relative to business-as-usual levels.‖73 
Finally, ACES sets standards for which countries that have 
established emissions trading schemes will be allowed to sell 
allowances into the United States cap and trade program. These 
standards are based on a United States government assessment of 
whether that country’s scheme is ―at least as stringent as the program 
established by this title, including provisions to ensure at least 
comparable monitoring, compliance, enforcement, quality of offsets, 
and restrictions on the use of offsets.‖74 
From this analysis it can be concluded that if a major developing 
economy undertakes commitments that are more comparable in form, 
content, and process to commitments undertaken by developed 
countries, it will less likely be subject to these kinds of unilateral 
measures from the United States. It also suggests that the institutions 
and procedures that may be making important determinations about a 
country’s compliance with its domestic climate policy or its 
international commitments may include regulatory agencies in other 
countries. 
Finally, it is important to note that a number of these unilateral 
measures would have an impact on the flow of products, services, 
and capital between countries and as such could trigger the 
application of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade and 
investment agreements. In some instances, this could include their 
dispute-settlement mechanisms. This could lead to a situation in 
which, for example, a WTO dispute-settlement panel is called on to 
assess whether restricting trade in products based on the 
comparability of climate legislation between two trading partners is a 
justifiable trade measure.75 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS: THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF LEGAL CHARACTER 
Lessons from other treaties tell us that international agreements 
with binding, specific commitments backed by robust review 
procedures are generally more effective. In general, signing on to 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. § 311.  
75. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION & UN ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf; GARY C. 
HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2009). 
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these kinds of commitments demonstrates strong political will, 
encourages other countries to do the same, and thus should lead to 
better environmental results. In most cases, the international penalties 
associated with failing to comply with an international treaty are 
unspecified, and thus the risks of being found in noncompliance seem 
low. 
Box 2 summarizes the risks and benefits that would be associated 
with a climate agreement that is either legally binding or nonbinding 
in its form; that contains high or low quality content, in terms of legal 
form, clarity, specificity, and ambition of obligations; and that 
contains more or less robust requirements for reporting and verifying 
compliance and enforcement. 
It is important to note that a treaty with a high standard of legal 
character has the potential to exclude the participation of some 
countries. The additional hurdles required by domestic ratification 
processes can act to exclude even some governments that would 
otherwise wish to join the regime. Others may simply feel unready to 
commit to its terms. In circumstances where this would lead to the 
exclusion of countries crucial to the treaty’s success, the different 
aspects of legal character need to be weighed carefully and, 
potentially, traded off against other aspects of an agreement. 
There are indications that a post-2012 climate change regime will 
support performance-based financial mechanisms and carbon markets 
that could reward countries that are willing to make specific 
undertakings. Our case study of draft U.S. legislation suggests that 
countries undertaking legally binding commitments may have 
preferential access to large-scale carbon markets and may be able to 
avoid the unilateral trade sanctions contemplated by the United States 
and others. 
There will be intense pressure on developing country major 
economies in general, and the higher emitters among them in 
particular, to take on commitments that are more closely comparable 
in their legal character to the commitments of industrialized 
countries. Industrialized countries will continue to push hard through 
the MEF and through the G-20 to secure commitments from major 
economies that are non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC and the KP 
that move them towards standards of form, content, and procedural 
and institutional oversight that are comparable to their own. 
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The contributions of a developing country major economy to the 
negotiations will be in part based on what it can afford to undertake 
politically and economically vis-a-vis its economic competitors and 
where it wishes to position itself geopolitically in the coming decades 
in relation to its peers on either side of the ―development divide.‖  
Given this wide diversity of views, the prospect of agreeing to a 
new, legally binding instrument that is widely perceived as balanced 
in terms of its form, content, and procedural and institutional 
treatment of commitments appears remote—particularly in the 
context where the adoption of such an instrument will require a 
consensus of all parties. There are at least two possible ways forward 
signaled by the Copenhagen Accord. The first is that countries that 
have long championed the need for a legally binding international 
instrument explicitly or implicitly abandon this goal and begin to 
pursue methods of ―internationalizing‖ the pledge and review of 
national policies through soft law approaches outside the UNFCCC 
process. This could have long-term consequences for the 
international community’s perception of the necessity and the utility 
of international law as a response to global environmental challenges. 
Alternatively, the UNFCCC parties could choose to reinvest in 
strengthening those aspects of the legal character of the climate 
change regime that are already within the UNFCCC’s mandate as a 
legally binding treaty. While the COP cannot, by decision alone, 
adopt new targets and actions that are binding on its parties, it has 
provided (and can continue to provide) a forum for its parties to 
report on their efforts to reduce emissions, such as those now 
contained in the Accord’s appendices. More importantly, it can 
strengthen and expand the operation of the institutions and 
procedures designed to ensure quality of data, harmonize standards 
and policies, coordinate carbon markets, and review parties’ 
performance. The insistence that there can be no progress without a 
new legally binding instrument, if it blocks movement forward within 
the UNFCCC, could, ironically, permanently undermine the 
credibility of the Convention—which remains the only legally 
binding instrument of near universal membership. 
 
